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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, claims of sexual harassment in the workplace have
increased. This increase has occurred, in part, because a larger
number of women have entered once male-dominated professions.,
In the realm of religion, the ministry has traditionally been a male-
1. A 1989 survey of 100 women factory workers found that those who worked in
jobs not traditionally held by women experienced far more harassment than those
who worked in jobs traditionally held by women. Daniel Goleman, Sexual Harassment:
It's About Power, Not Lust, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 22, 1991, at CI.
1
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dominated profession.2 Notwithstanding this fact, women, more
than ever, are entering the ranks of the clergy.S Currently, over
20,000 women serve among the 250,000 Protestant clergy in the
United States.4
As more women enter what was once an all-male bastion, sexual
harassment of female clergy members, too, has increased.5 Both fed-
eral and state civil rights laws recognize sexual harassment as a form
of gender discrimination.6 However, civil courts7 have been reluc-
2. The ordination of women began among Methodists and Presbyterians in
1956, Lutherans in 1970, ReformJews in 1972, Episcopalians in 1976, and Conserva-
tive Jews in 1985. See Michael Hirsley, Women in Pulpit not Foreordained, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 6, 1991, at C9. The Roman Catholic Church and the Missouri Synod Lutheran
Church still do not allow the ordination of women. Id.
3. In 1971, there were only 3358 women enrolled in Christian seminaries in
North America. Id. During the 1990-1991 school year, more than 59,000 students
were enrolled in seminary programs; approximately 25,000 of those students were
enrolled in the Masters of Divinity programs which lead to ordination. Women en-
trants accounted for twenty-four percent of the students enrolled in Masters of Divin-
ity programs. Id. The number of men enrolled in seminaries has declined steadily
since 1975. Id.
4. George W. Cornell, Women Clergy Cite Harassment, CHI. TRIB., April 12, 1991,
at C9.
5. A study by the United Methodist Church's General Council on Ministries
found that seventy-seven percent of its female clergy have reported some form of
sexual harassment. Id. Of this seventy-seven percent, forty-one percent were
harassed by fellow clergy members. Id. In a 1987 survey, conducted by the United
Church of Christ, forty-three percent of the female clergy reported incidents of sex-
ual harassment, either by fellow clergy or parishioners. No Sanctuary from Sex Bias,
CHI. TRIB.,Jan. 15, 1987, at C2. Rev.Judith Gerlitz, a pastor of the Lutheran Church
of America (ELCA), asserts that "the church has done little" about sexual harass-
ment. Lutherans Allow Dissent in Pronouncements, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1989, Section 1,
at 22. However, at its first church-wide assembly, the ELCA stated that it "will not
tolerate any form of sexual abuse or harassment by any of its personnel." Id.
6. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has defined sexual harass-
ment as "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature . EEOC, Guidelines on Discrimination Because
of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991).
In addition, the Minnesota Human Rights Act defines sexual harassment as "un-
welcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, sexually motivated physical con-
tact or other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature ....
MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 41 (1990). During the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas con-
frontation, the Minnesota Department of Human Rights developed a list to inform
people what sort of conduct may constitute sexual harassment in the workplace. The
list includes:
1. Unwanted or unnecessary touching;
2. Grabbing;
3. Cornering;
4. Kissing or hugging;
5. Sexual remarks or suggestions;
6. Unwanted sexual compliments;
7. Pornographic pictures or stories, dirty jokes;
8. Offensive displays of sex-related objects;
[Vol. 19
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tant to recognize discrimination claims brought by clergy members
against the religious institutions that employ them.8
Claims of sexual harassment against religious institutions have
been relatively rare.9 However, a recent Minnesota Court of Appeals
decision has opened the door a bit wider for future litigants. In Black
v. Snyder,IO the court of appeals departed from clearly established
precedent and held a church accountable for the misconduct of its
ministers."I The Black court allowed a female minister to pursue a
9. Demanding sexual favors accompanied by implied or overt threats,
such as those regarding conditions of employment;
10. Repeated belittling, demeaning, insulting remarks because of sex;
11. Unequal application of performance standards, discipline or work
rules because of sex;
12. Sabotaging an employee's character, reputation, work efforts because
of sex;
13. Unequal assignment of the "dirty work," less responsible or less chal-
lenging duties not based on abilities, because of sex.
MPLS. STAR TRIB., Oct. 13, 1991, at 5A.
7. Throughout this Note, the term "civil courts" shall refer to federal and state
courts to distinguish them from ecclesiastical courts.
8. See, e.g., Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 947 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that
"courts have consistently found that Title VII does not apply to the relationship be-
tween ministers and the religious organizations that employ them, even where the
discrimination is alleged on the basis of race or sex.").
9. But see Nigrelli v. Catholic Bishop, 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 495 (N.D.
Ill. March 14, 1991) (refusing to grant summary judgment against a female Catholic
school principal who presented a prima facie case of sexual harassment); Davis v.
Black, 591 N.E.2d 11 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (reversing summary judgment in case
where church secretary was discharged after bringing forth sexual harassment claim
against pastor of church).
In one widely reported case, a church disciplinary body considered a claim for
sexual harassment. Laura Sessions-Stepp and Molly Sinclair, United Methodist Church
Puts Minister on Trial on Sex Charges, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1985, at CI. A United
Methodist minister was charged with "immorality and disobedience to the order and
discipline of the United Methodist Church," for alleged sexual harassment of five
female employees. Id. He was tried pursuant to procedures in the Church's Book of
Discipline, by a court of thirteen ministers. Id. He was convicted for disobeying
church law, but acquitted of the immorality charge. Laura Sessions-Stepp, Methodist
Minister Guilty of One Charge, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1985, at Al. The minister was
suspended from the ministry for three years. Id.
Few civil actions against the church for the misconduct of their ministers have
prevailed. See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Community Church, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988) (re-
fusing to hold the church liable for pastoral counselor's failure to refer person to
therapist), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007 (1989). See also Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d
275, 287 (Colo. 1988) (refusing to hold archdiocese liable for the conduct of a clergy-
man); Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1244 (Ohio 1988) (refusing to hold
church liable on agency principles for conduct of a minister). But see Mrozka v. Arch-
diocese of St. Paul, 482 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming an award of
punitive damages against a church whose pastor sexually abused a child), review de-
nied, (Minn. May 15, 1992).
10. 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, (Minn. Aug. 29, 1991).
11. Id.
1993]
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sexual harassment claim against the Lutheran church that employed
her and rejected the church's argument that the claim was barred by
federal and state guarantees of religious freedom.12 In applying dis-
crimination legislation to a religious institution, the court faces the
dilemma of balancing the church's right to religious freedom against
the individual's right to be free from discrimination. Such conflicts
are not easily resolved.
This Comment will discuss the application of employment discrim-
ination legislation to religious institutions and examine the underly-
ing constitutional principles implicated in this context. Further, this
Comment will examine the reasoning of the Black decision and ana-
lyze subsequent Minnesota developments. This Comment concludes
that when a member of the clergy alleges gender discrimination, the
church's right to religious freedom should take precedence over the
individual's right to be free from discrimination.
II. HISTORY OF THE LAW
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution mandates
the separation of church and state.13 Despite the seemingly inviolate
language of the constitution, this "wall of separation"14 is not im-
penetrable. Since the adoption of the constitution, changes in Amer-
ican society have made it virtually impossible for government and
religion to occupy completely separate spheres. 15 The expansion by
12. Id. at 718.
13. The religion clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
14. The Supreme Court has used this phrase to describe the relationship be-
tween government and religion:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man
and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship;
that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not
opinions,-I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church and State.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting 26 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 281-82 (Andrew A. Lipscomb, ed., 1905) containing a letter from
Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association dated January 1, 1802).
15. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) (noting that the
"complexities of modern life inevitably produce some contact" between the church
and the government). But see Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 212 (1948) (stating that "the First Amendment rests upon the premise that both
religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free
from the other within its respective sphere"). The growing diversity of religious
groups in the United States and the movement of religious groups into areas that
were once primarily secular has been cited as one of the causes of the increase in
litigation involving church and state. Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on
[Vol. 19
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religious organizations into areas previously considered secular16
and the demands of modern society have subjected religious organi-
zations to increased government regulation.17
A. The Principle of Deference
Despite increasing regulation, religious institutions retain a high
level of autonomy over internal religious matters. The First Amend-
ment bars civil courts from interfering in the internal disputes of reli-
gious institutions.I8 Disputes over control of church property, the
selection of clergy, 19 and the discipline of members are "ecclesiasti-
Governmental Interference with Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 366-
70 (1984).
16. See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 306
(1985) (holding that a religious foundation's commercial activities are not beyond the
reach of the Fair Labor Standards Act); Salvation Army v. Department of Community
Affairs, 919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding state building codes applicable to reli-
gious institutions); Health Services Div., Health and Env't Dep't v. Temple Baptist
Church, 814 P.2d 130 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that church childcare center
must be licensed by state), review denied, (N.M. June 20, 1991). See generally Bruce N.
Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by
Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979) (noting that a religious institu-
tion's First Amendment claim for exemption from applicable laws diminishes de-
pending on the "secularity" of the activity).
17. See Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir.
1991) (holding that a zoning ordinance that restricts churches from business district
does not violate Free Exercise Clause); St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New
York, 914 F.2d 348, 355 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the application of a historic
landmark ordinance to churches does not violate Free Exercise Clause), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 1103 (1991); First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1361, 1362
(Wash. 1990) (holding that application of historic preservation laws violates the
church's free exercise rights), vacated, 111 S.Ct. 1097 (1991) (remanded for reconsid-
eration in light of Employment Div., Dep't. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990)).
18. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871); DavidJ. Young &
Steven W. Tigges, Into the Religious Thicket-Constitutional Limits on Civil Court Jurisdic-
tion over Ecclesiastical Disputes, 47 OHIo ST. L.J. 475, 476-80 (1986) (discussing the
development of the principle of deference).
19. The notion of noninterference with the selection of clergy probably
originated in England, where, despite the fact of state-sponsorship, the Anglican
Church retained power over confirmation of its clergy. The laws under Edward II
prohibited temporal courts from interfering in the appointment of clergy:
Also It is desired that Spiritual Persons, whom our Lord the King doth pres-
ent unto Benefices of the Church, if the Bishop will not admit them, either
for Lack of Learning, or for other cause reasonable, may not be under the
Examination of Lay Persons in the Cases aforesaid, as it is now attempted,
contrary to the Decrees Canonical, but that they may sue unto a Spiritual
Judge, for Remedy, as right shall require .... Of the ability of a Parson
presented unto a Benefice of the Church the Examination belongeth to a
Spiritual Judge; and so it hath been used heretofore, and shall be hereafter.
Articles of the Clergy, 9 Edw. 2, ch. 13 (1315-16) (Eng.).
19931
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cal" disputes and thus fall outside the jurisdiction of civil courts.20
These ecclesiastical disputes may also include conflicts arising out of
the church-minister employment relationship.21
Traditionally, civil courts have deferred to the decisions of church
bodies on matters involving ecclesiastical disputes. The principle of
judicial deference while not originally grounded in the Constitu-
tion,22 dates back to 1871. In Watson v. Jones,23 the Supreme Court
refused to intervene in a dispute between church factions, holding
that civil courts have no jurisdiction where intervention would re-
quire review of decisions made by an ecclesiastical body.24 The
court offered three justifications in support of this holding. First, it
noted that when an individual voluntarily joins a hierarchical reli-
gious organization,25 the individual impliedly consents to that form
of church government and agrees to be bound by its decisions.2 6
Second, judicial review of the decisions of ecclesiastical bodies
threatens the integrity of religious institutions.2 7 Third, because a
hierarchical church operates under its own body of ecclesiastical
law,2 8 civil court judges are not competent to interpret that law.29
20. In Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929), the court held
that, "[i]n the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the
proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil
rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because the
parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise." Id. at 16. In Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 713 (1976), the court held that
civil courts may not review the decisions of the judicial bodies of hierarchical reli-
gious organizations "on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesi-
astical rule, custom or law." Id. at 713.
21. See, e.g., Kaufmann v. Sheehan, 707 F.2d 355, 358 (8th Cir. 1983) (refusing to
consider a priest's defamation claim against the Roman Catholic Church, because his
"claims relate[d] to his status and employment as a priest, and ... [went] to the heart
of internal church discipline, faith, and church organization, all involved with ecclesi-
astical rule, custom and law."); Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 493
(5th Cir. 1974) (noting that the relationship between a church and its minister is
ecclesiastical in nature).
22. See generally Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church
Automony and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1291 (1980).
23. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
24. Id. at 729.
25. A hierarchical church is one that is "but a subordinate member of some gen-
eral church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a
general and ultimate power of control..I. " d. at 722. In contrast, a congregational
church is one which is independent of any higher religious authority. Id. See generally
66 Am.JUR. 2D Religious Societies § 3 (1973) (discussing the hierarchical and congrega-
tional church organizations).
26. Watson, 80 U.S. at 729.
27. Id.
28. Several hierarchical churches have well-established legal systems, including
ecclesiastical courts and extensive legal codes. See generally Carl H. Esbeck, Tort Claims
Against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First Amendment Considerations, 89 W. VA. L.
[Vol. 19
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Notwithstanding the Court's recognition of the deference princi-
ple, the Supreme Court did not accord constitutional status to this
principle until 1952. In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian
Orthodox Church,30 the Court recognized that "[llegislation that regu-
lates church administration, the operation of the churches, [or] the
appointment of clergy [is] prohibited by the free exercise [clausel."3'
B. Neutral Principles Exception
In 1979, the Supreme Court developed a narrow exception to the
principle of deference through a "neutral principles" approach to
resolving property disputes.32 In Jones v. Wolf,3 3 the Supreme Court,
in essence, stated that, where the issue at hand does not involve
church doctrine and would not require a court to delve into tradi-
tional church matters, civil courts may resolve specified religious
matters.3 4 The dispute in Jones arose over control of property be-
tween two churches-both formally associated with the Presbyterian
Church-and the governing body of the Presbyterian Church.35 The
Court held that a civil court could examine documents relating to
church property ownership.36
Applying "neutral principles of law," the Court noted that resolu-
tion of a property dispute "relies exclusively on objective, well-estab-
lished concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and
judges," and is therefore "flexible enough to accommodate all forms
of religious organization and polity." 37 Thus, through the Jones v.
Wolf test, the Supreme Court granted civil courts jurisdiction to de-
termine who held title to the property. The Court concluded that
this "neutral principles" approach did not violate the constitutional
prohibition against interfering in ecclesiastical disputes.38
Since Jones, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
gone one step further and extended this rationale to encompass
REv. 1, 63-76 (1986) (summarizing the church discipline procedures of several large
denominations).
29. Watson, 80 U.S. at 729.
30. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
31. Id. at 107-08.
32. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
33. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
34. Id. at 604.
35. Id. at 598-99.
36. Id. at 604.
37. Id. at 603. Minnesota courts have applied the Jones v. Wolf test to determine
whether a religious dispute may be resolved in the state court system. See, e.g., Pile-
tich v. Deretich, 328 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Minn. 1982) (applying neutral principles ap-
proach to church property dispute); Patterson v. Bethel Baptist Church, 389 N.W.2d
729, 732 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the civil court was an inappropriate
forum for doctrinal disputes where church members sue for reinstatement).
38. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-03 (1979).
1993]
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specified contract claims. In Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of
United Methodist Church,39 a potential pastoral appointee sued the
United Methodist Church, claiming discrimination on the basis of his
age and breach of his employment contract.40 The court concluded
that an employment contract dispute may be resolved through "neu-
tral methods of proof."4' The use of "neutral methods of proof"
would enable the court to avoid a "searching and therefore imper-
missible inquiry into church doctrine." 42 The court noted that "the
line between such proscribed lawsuits and legitimate claims for com-
mercial obligations of a church is a thin one"43 and concluded that
the employee was "entitled to prove up his claim of breach of an oral
contract to the extent that he can divine a course clear of the
Church's ecclesiastical domain."44
C. The First Amendment
1. The Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause provides the foundation for the princi-
ple of noninterference with religious institutions.as The Free Exer-
cise Clause also guarantees an individual the right to hold whatever
religious beliefs he or she chooses.46 In effect, however, the Free
Exercise Clause does not guarantee an absolute right to practice
those beliefs. 47
Under First Amendment doctrine, courts may exempt individuals
from compliance with facially neutral laws which burden religious
beliefs upon a demonstration that the individual's free exercise of a
religious belief outweighs the state's interest in enforcing these
laws.48 Courts have traditionally required the state to demonstrate a
39. 894 F.2d 1354, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
40. Minker, 894 F.2d at 1355.
41. Id. at 1360. But see Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 493-94
(5th Cir. 1974) (declining to apply a "neutral principles of law" analysis to a church-
minister employment dispute).
42. Minker, 894 F.2d at 1355 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 723 (1976)).
43. Id. at 1361.
44. Id.
45. See Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); see also Kenneth F.
Ripple, The Entangiment Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L.
REV. 1195, 1210-14 (1980).
46. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
47. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (rejecting a
Mormon church member's claim that statute criminalizing polygamy infringed on his
religious beliefs because state was exercising its inherent power to promote health,
safety, and general welfare).
48. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-36 (1972) (holding that
Amish parents' sincerely held belief against formal high school education outweighs
government's interest in compulsory education); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
[Vol. 19
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol19/iss1/4
DISCRIMINATION AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
compelling state interest in enforcing the law.4 9 The compelling
state interest test requires the court to examine (1) the degree to
which the statute impairs the exercise of the religious belief; (2) the
degree of state interest in enforcing the statute; and (3) the extent to
which an exemption from the statute would impede state
objectives.50
Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court departed sig-
nificantly from this traditional standard. In Employment Division De-
partment of Human Resources v. Smith,51 the Court held that the state
need not show a compelling interest to enforce a facially neutral law
that burdens religious practices.52 After Smith, the state need only
demonstrate the existence of a compelling state interest if the law
expressly prohibits religious conduct or implicates the Free Exercise
406-09 (1963) (holding that Seventh-day Adventist's interest in religious practice
outweighed government's interest in preventing fraud in unemployment compensa-
tion system).
49. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234-36.
50. See id. While the Supreme Court has grounded the principle of noninterfer-
ence with the internal affairs of religious institutions firmly in the Free Exercise
Clause, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have not explicitly relied on either the
Free Exercise Clause, but ambiguously state that non-interference is grounded in the
First Amendment. See e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 713 (1976) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from dis-
turbing the decisions of an ecclesiastical tribunal). As a result, the principle of defer-
ence, which has its basis in the Free Exercise Clause, has evolved into the concept of
excessive entanglement, which is one of the central elements of Establishment Clause
analysis. See Kenneth F. Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten Year
Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1210-14 (1980) (discussing the development of
the "entanglement concept" in free exercise cases beginning with Watson v. Jones,
80 U.S. 679 (1871) and its subsequent transfer to Establishment Clause); see also
Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church
Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1981). Lay-
cock argues that the Supreme Court has not applied a consistent general theory to
the religion clauses. Id. He argues that the Establishment Clause is only implicated
where government provides support for religion. Id. at 1378-88.
The incorporation of the doctrine of excessive entanglement into the Lemon test
has caused courts to incorrectly associate this concept only with the Establishment
Clause. This negatively affects the autonomy of religious institutions in two ways.
First, courts tend to favor Free Exercise Clause interests over those associated with
the Establishment Clause. Ripple, supra note 50, at 1212. Second, while the
Supreme Court has been aggressive in preventing government sponsorship of or aid
to religious groups, it has not been as aggressive in protecting religious groups from
government interference. See Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmen-
tal Interference with Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 349 (1984).
51. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
52. Id. at 882-90. Prior to Smith, the Supreme Court had held that the regulation
must serve a compelling state interest that outweighed the detrimental impact on the
religious practice. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. See also Bob Jones Uni-
versity v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 (1983); see generally Michael W. McCon-
nell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990)
(criticizing the court's abandonment of the compelling interest standard).
1993]
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Clause and another constitutional right, such as freedom of
speech.53 With its decision in Smith, the Supreme Court had radi-
cally altered what was "a settled and inviolate principle of ... First
Amendment jurisprudence."54
2. The Establishment Clause
Even where free exercise interests are not implicated, government
regulation of religious institutions may violate the Establishment
Clause.55 In evaluating government regulation under the Establish-
ment Clause, the United States Supreme Court has noted that "the
men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment con-
noted the establishment of a religion with sponsorship, financial sup-
port, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."56
Later Court decisions offered a more restrictive interpretation of the
Establishment Clause.57 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,58 the Court held that
a valid regulation affecting religion must (1) have a secular purpose;
(2) neither advance nor inhibit religion in its primary effect;59 and (3)
not foster excessive governmental entanglement6O with religion.61
Under the Lemon test, laws that benefit a particular religion or imply
government sponsorship or endorsement will generally run afoul of
the "primary effect" prong.6 2 The "excessive entanglement" prong
53. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 303, 304-07
(1940) (freedom of speech); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (rights of par-
ents to educate their children as they choose)).
54. Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. The Establishment Clause provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
56. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
57. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624-25 (1971). The restrictive inter-
pretation of the Establishment Clause laid down in Lemon has drawn criticism from
several Supreme Court justices who have characterized the interpretation as "hos-
tile" toward religious freedom, and inconsistent with the framers' intent. See Lemon,
403 U.S. at 665 (White, J., dissenting); Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655
(1989) (KennedyJ., dissenting); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-13 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
59. Nearly any government action that exempts a religious organization from
complying with a generally applicable law can be said to advance religion and thus
implicate the Establishment Clause. However, "[flor a law to have forbidden 'effects'
under Lemon, it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion
through its own activities and influence." Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987) (emphasis in original).
60. The concept of excessive entanglement was first introduced in Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). See generally Ripple, supra note 50, at 1195.
61. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
62. See, e.g., Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 656-57 (1989) (holding
that display of creche and menorah in courthouse violates the Establishment Clause);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987) (overturning Louisiana's "crea-
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is generally implicated either when the government takes action that
benefits particular religious organizations6S or attempts to regulate
religious institutions.
D. The Minnesota Constitution
A state court's reliance on the state constitution as an alternative
source for protecting individual rights is a practice supported by the
United States Supreme Court.64 Because of the Smith Court's dra-
matic reinterpretation of the Free Exercise Clause,65 the Minnesota
Supreme Court has turned to its own constitution to restore reli-
gious protections lost as a result of the Court's decision in Smith.66
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted church
and state provisions of the Minnesota Constitution more expansively
than similar provisions of the Federal Constitution.67 For example,
tionism" act mandating the equal treatment of evolution and creation science in pub-
lic schools).
63. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (holding that although pri-
mary effect was not to advance or inhibit religion, law that made Title I funds avail-
able to religious schools caused excessive entanglement).
64. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1983) (holding that the Supreme
Court will not review decisions of state courts when based on an adequate and in-
dependent state ground); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81
(1980) (holding that state courts must follow the United States Supreme Court on
federal constitutional law, but are free to interpret their laws to provide greater pro-
tection of individual liberties).
FormerJustice Brennan is a strong proponent of this approach. Justice Brennan
stated:
State supreme courts are increasingly evaluating their state constitutions
and concluding that those constitutions should be applied to confer greater
civil liberties than their federal counterparts .... We can and should wel-
come this development in state constitutional jurisprudence-indeed, my
own view is that rediscovery by state supreme courts of the broader protec-
tions afforded their own citizens by their state constitutions ... is probably
the most important development in constitutional jurisprudence of our
times. For state constitutional law will assume an increasingly more visible
role in American law in the years ahead.
Robert Abrams, Introduction to 1 EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Xi
(1988) (quoting address by Justice Brennan, "The Fourteenth Amendment" (Aug. 8,
1986)). In addition, Justice Rehnquist has added: "in the fields of liberty as well as
property, the states must be left to work out their destinies within broad limits."
George Lardner, Jr., '50s Memos Illustrate Rehnquist Consistency, WASH. POST, July 20,
1986, at 14.
65. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
66. In State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8 (Minn. 1990), the court stated, "in light of
the unforeseeable changes in established first amendment law set forth in recent de-
cisions of the United States Supreme Court, justice demands that we analyze the
present case in light of the protections found in the Minnesota Constitution." Id.
67. See, e.g., Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn.
1991) (holding that the right to counsel under the Minnesota Constitution provides
greater protection than the United States Constitution); State v. Hershberger, 462
N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990) (stating that "Minnesotans are afforded greater pro-
1993]
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in State v. French,68 the court held that the Minnesota Constitution's
freedom of conscience clause69 offers significantly greater protection
than the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.70
Under the freedom of conscience clause, the state may only interfere
with religious practices when such practices are "licentious" or "in-
consistent with the peace or safety of the state." 7 '
While the French court clearly stated that government may not in-
terfere with an individual's right to freely practice his religious be-
liefs absent a compelling state interest, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has not directly addressed the issue of whether the state may
regulate religious institutions in ways that do not implicate religious
beliefs or practices. Because Minnesota lacks a large body of case
law interpreting its constitution,7 2 Minnesota courts have turned to
tection for religious liberties against governmental action under the state constitu-
tion than under the first amendment of the federal constitution."). See also State v.
Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. 1991) (stating that the United States Supreme
Court interpretation of the constitution is "of inherently persuasive, although not
compelling force.").
68. French, 460 N.W.2d at 8.
69. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16. The freedom of conscience clause provides:
The right of every man to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any man be compelled to at-
tend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any religious or
ecclesiastical ministry, against his consent; nor shall any control of or inter-
ference with the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be
given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship; but the
liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse
acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or
safety of the state, nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the
benefit of any religious societies or religious or theological seminaries.
Id.
70. See French, 460 N.W.2d at 9. See also State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393,
400 (Minn. 1990) (characterizing the freedom of conscience clause as both an
"enumeration of primordial rights and a limitation on the power of the state."). See
generally Rita C. DeMeules, Minnesota's Variable Approach to State Constitutional Claims, 17
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 163 (1991) (discussing the Minnesota court's "haphazard ap-
proach to applying its state constitution.").
71. State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 1990). In French, a landlord had
refused to rent a home to an unmarried couple. Id. at 3. He claimed an exemption
from compliance with Minnesota Human Rights Act, claiming that renting to an un-
married couple violated his religious beliefs. Id. at 3-4. The court held that the state
had failed to establish a compelling interest that would override the landlord's inter-
est in practicing his religion. Id. at 9.
In Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, Amish citizens sought exemption from compli-
ance with a statute requiring a slow-moving vehicle emblem on their horse-drawn
carraiges. Id. at 395. The supreme court held that where the state has shown a com-
pelling interest, the challenged regulation must be the least restrictive means avail-
able to protect its interest. Id. at 399. The court concluded that the state had failed
to demonstrate the use of the least restrictive alternative. Id.
72. There are few resources available to discern the intent of the framers of the
Minnesota Constitution. See William Anderson, The Constitution of Minnesota, 5 MINN.
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federal constitutional doctrine as well as state history for guidance in
interpreting the state constitution. 73
E. Statutory Protections
1. Federal Statutory Protections: Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars discrimination in
public and private employment on the basis of race, color, religion,
gender, or national origin.74 Under Title VII, sexual harassment is a
form of gender discrimination because an individual subjected to
sexual harassment is treated differently based on the individual's
gender.75 The statute advances two theories under which sexual
harassment claims may be brought.76 The first theory-quid pro
quo sexual harassment-applies in situations where employment
"involves the conditioning of ... concrete employment benefits on
sexual favors." 77 The second theory-"hostile environment" the-
L. REV. 407 (1921). When the Minnesota Constitution was enacted in 1858, the con-
stitutional convention met in two separate factions, the Democrats and the Republi-
cans. Id. at 409. No minutes exist from the meetings of the ten member conference
committee that hammered out the final compromise version of the constitution. Id.
at 430. However, some evidence of intent may be derived from the debates of the
constitutional convention. See generally EARLE S. GOODRICH, THE DEBATES AND PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE MINNESOTA CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION (1857).
73. See, e.g., Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn.
1991) (applying federal "critical stage" analysis); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d
393, 396 (Minn. 1990) (applying federal "compelling state interest" and "least re-
strictive alternative" standards).
Some have noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court has not grounded its inter-
pretation of the Minnesota Constitution in historical evidence but rather in "general-
ities." See Friedman, 473 N.W.2d at 846 (Coyne, J., dissenting).
Additionally the French court cited a Wisconsin case, Weiss v. District Bd. of
School Dist. No. 8, 76 Wis. 177, 197-98, 44 N.W. 967, 974-75 (1890), to reinforce its
assertion that freedom of religion was fundamental to the framers of the Minnesota
Constitution. State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9 (Minn. 1990).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988)). Title VII provides, in relevant part, that it
is unlawful "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin ..." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988).
75. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987). The Hicks
court defined sexual harassment as "any harassment or other unequal treatment of
an employee or group of employees that would not occur but for the sex of the em-
ployee or employees." Id. at 1415 (quoting McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138
(D.C. Cir. 1985). Not all commentators agree that sexual harassment is a form of
discrimination. See Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defec-
tive Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333 (1990). Paul argues that sexual harassment
should not be actionable as a form of discrimination, but rather as a tort similar to
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 361.
76. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 62 (1986).
77. Id.
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ory78-arises in contexts where the sexually harassing conduct of a
fellow employee has the "effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment." 79
Once the claimant has established that harassment occurred, the
court must determine whether the employer is liable for the acts of
its employee. In doing so, the United States Supreme Court has di-
rected lower federal courts to the principles of agency law.80 In or-
der to avoid liability for sexual harassment, an employer must
investigate an employee's complaint and take reasonable action to
prevent further harassment. 8 1 An employer who takes no action is
clearly liable. However, absent a complete failure to respond, no ex-
78. Id. at 65 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 957 (1972)).
79. EEOC, Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a)(3)
(1991).
80. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. In Meritor, the Court concluded that in formulat-
ing Title VII, the congressional intent was for "courts to look to agency principles for
guidance" in the area of liability. Id. Under agency theory, the actions of the agent
may be imputed to the principal even where the principal has no notice of the harass-
ment. Id. Section 219 of the Second Restatement of Agency provides:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while
acting in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside
the scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and
there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplish-
ing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
Where the harasser has no supervisory authority over the plaintiff,
agency principles are generally not applicable. See, e.g., Hirschfeld v. New
Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 579 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding cor-
rectional facility not liable for prison guard's action towards non-supervi-
sory secretary). In such cases, an employer may be held liable for the sexual
harassment of an employee by a co-worker if it "had actual or constructive
knowledge of the existence of a sexually hostile working environment" and
failed to take prompt and adequate steps to alleviate it. See Katz v. Dole,
709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983). Knowledge on the part of the employer
will be imputed if the harassment is "pervasive" or if harassment complaints
were filed with the employer. Id. See also EEOC, Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1991) (stating that where the em-
ployer knows or should have known of the conduct, liability exists unless the
employer can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective ac-
tion); MINN. STAT. § 363.01(41)(3) (1990) (stating that liability attaches
where the employer knows or should know and fails to take timely appropri-
ate action).
81. See, e.g., Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 558 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding
that an employer need not discredit all allegations, and that a written warning is an
adequate response if done in a timely manner).
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plicit guidelines exist to establish what type of response is necessary
to insulate an employer from liability.82 One circuit court of appeals
has held that an employer must do more than indicate that it has
formulated policies forbidding sexual harassment; the employer
must show that it took actions "reasonably calculated to end the
harassment.8S
2. Minnesota Human Rights Act
The Minnesota Human Rights Act (the Act) provides additional
protection to persons alleging discrimination on the basis of sex.8 4
Because of the similarity between Title VII and the Act, Minnesota
courts have applied the principles developed in Title VII cases, when
construing the Act.85
The Minnesota Supreme Court has applied the Act in situations
arising under the hostile work environment theory. In Continental
Can v. State,8 6 the Minnesota Supreme Court developed the following
test:
To determine whether actionable sex discrimination exists in a
given case, all the circumstances surrounding the conduct alleged
to constitute sexual harassment, such as the nature of the incidents
and the context in which they occurred, should be examined. In
addition, the facts alleged to constitute notice to the employer of
the employee's conduct as well as the circumstances surrounding
those facts should be considered. Finally, the timeliness and ap-
propriateness of the employer's response, if any, to the conduct
complained of should be examined.
8 7
In the year following Continental Can, the legislature amended the Act
82. See, e.g., Katz, 709 F.2d at 256.
83. Id.
84. MINN. STAT. § 363.01-.15 (1992). Specifically, the act prohibits employers
from discharging, refusing to hire, or discriminating against employees with respect
to the terms and conditions of employment "because of race, color, creed, religion,
national origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, member-
ship or activity in a local commission, disability, or age." MINN. STAT. § 363.03(1)(2)
(1992).
85. See, e.g., Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Minn. 1978) (citing Broth-
erhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks v. State, 303 Minn. 178, 188, 229 N.W.2d 3, 9
(1975); Zimdars v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 304 Minn. 288, 230 N.W.2d 465
(1975)).
86. 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980).
87. Id. at 249. See also Klink v. Ramsey County, 397 N.W.2d 894, 901 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986). In Klink, the court of appeals established the elements of a prima facie
case of sexual harassment. Id. The court adopted a test relied on by several other
jurisdictions. The test was based on the analysis set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Id.
A prima facie case requires that (1) the employee belongs to a protected group; (2)
the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was
based on sex; (4) the harassment affects a "term, condition, or privilege" of employ-
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to include definitions of sexual harassment and to reflect the fact that
sexual harassment is a form of gender discrimination.88
3. The Application of Statutory Protections to the Church-Minister
Relationship
Whether an individual may pursue an employment discrimination
claim against the religious institution employing the individual de-
pends largely upon the individual's role within the institution. Min-
isters are considered employees, whose primary duties involve
"teaching, spreading the faith, church governance ... or participa-
tion in religious ritual and worship."89 Historically, civil courts have
not permitted ministers to pursue employment discrimination
claims, because churches are considered to have complete discretion
over the hiring of their ministers, regardless of the existence of civil
rights violations.90 Accordingly, Title VII is not applicable to the
employment relationship between ministers and the religious institu-
tions they serve.9 1
For example, in McClure v. Salvation Army,9 2 an ordained female
minister filed an action under Title VII alleging wage discrimination
on the basis of gender.93 The employer terminated her after she
filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
ment; and (5) the employer is liable based on knowledge or imputed knowledge of
the harassment and failure to take remedial action. Id.
88. See Act of March 23, 1982, ch. 619 § 3, 1982 Minn. Laws 1508 (codified as
MINN. STAT. § 363.01(41) (1982)). For a more detailed summary of the evolution of
the Minnesota Human Rights Act, see generally Joan Fluegel, Note, Sexual Harassment
and Battery: Mutually Exclusive Remedies for Independent Harms, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
627, 632-37 (1990) (discussing the evolution of the Minnesota Human Rights Act
and recoverable damages).
89. Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169
(4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986). Whether a particular individual has
acted in a ministerial capacity is often the decisive factor in employment discrimina-
tion litigation. Compare EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651
F.2d 277, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that Title VII was inapplicable to faculty
members at a seminary, who were considered ministers because only religious sub-
jects were taught), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982) with EEOC v. Mississippi College,
626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that Title VII applied to non-ministerial
faculty members at a college since they were not intermediaries between church and
congregation and did not instruct students on matters of religious doctrine), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981).
90. E.g., Gonzales v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1929).
91. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971); Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944,
947 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding religious institutions exempt from discrimination claims
based on religion under Title VII); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560
(5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972). See also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (holding religious schools exempt under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act).
92. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
93. Id. at 555.
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sion.94 The Fifth Circuit concluded that Title VII was not applicable
to ministers, since its application "would result in an encroachment
by the State into an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to
enter by the principles of the free exercise clause of the First Amend-
ment." 95 To the plaintiff's discrimination claim, the court re-
sponded that Congress had never intended to subject churches to
Title VII claims.9 6
In addition, Title VII contains an exemption for employment deci-
sions made by religious institutions that are necessary to carry out
the institution's religious activities.97 Title VII therefore applies to
religious institutions only when discrimination targets nonministerial
employees, and the discrimination is based on race or gender.9 8
Where an employment decision made by the church intertwines with
religious doctrine, the decision is usually exempt from compliance
with anti-discrimination laws. 99
III. BLACK V. SNYDER
A. The Facts
In 1989, Susan Black began working as an associate pastor of St.
John's Lutheran Church of Washburn Park, Minnesota.100 The
94. Id.
95. Id. at 560.
96. Id. (citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring)).
97. In pertinent part, the Title VII provision reads:
This subchapter shall not apply to . . . a religious corporation, association,
educational institution or society with respect to the employment of individ-
uals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on
by such corporation, association, or society of its religious activities.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1988). This exemption is applicable to ministerial and non-
ministerial employees, as well as to the activities of religious institutions that are not
religious in nature. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338
(1987).
Like Title VII, the Minnesota Human Rights Act contains a provision permitting
religious institutions to discriminate on the basis of religion. MINN. STAT.
§ 363.02(1)(2) (1992).
98. EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 286 (5th
Cir. 1981) (holding that because seminary's religious beliefs did not require discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex, race, color or national origin, its free exercise interests
were not burdened by application of Title VII to non-ministerial employees), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982).
99. See, e.g., Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160, 1165 (Mass. 1985) (holding that
church's beliefs regarding homosexuality exempted it from compliance with ordi-
nance barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
100. Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 717 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied,
(Minn. Aug. 29, 1991). Black was hired pursuant to a Letter of Call which constituted
her employment contract. Brief for Appellant at 4, Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (No. C5-91-71).
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church was a member of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of
America (ELCA).101 Black was supervised by William Snyder, an-
other pastor at the church.10 2 When Snyder allegedly made sexual
overtures toward Black, she brought her concerns to the attention of
the personnel and call committees at St. John's. 103 After consulting
with the bishop and the Synod's attorney, an investigation team con-
vened to examine Black's complaint.' 0 4 The team concluded that
Black's allegations were "not worthy of church discipline"105 and
recommended that both pastors seek therapy to resolve what the
team considered a lack of understanding as to Pastor Black's
"boundaries."106
Black responded by filing a complaint with the Minnesota Depart-
ment of Human Rights (MDHR), alleging that Snyder had made re-
peated unwelcome sexual overtures.' 07 Three months after Black
filed her claim with the MDHR, the congregation voted to discharge
her.108 Black then withdrew her complaint from the MDHR109 and
filed suit in Hennepin County District Court, naming Snyder, the
church, and the Synod as defendants.' 1o The trial court dismissed
the claims against the church and the synod, concluding that these
claims were barred by the First Amendment.IIl Black appealed the
dismissal to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.'12
B. The Court's Analysis
First, the court of appeals examined whether the application of the
Minnesota Human Rights Act to the church violated the Free Exer-
101. Black, 471 N.W.2d at 717. The ELCA was formed in January, 1988, after a
merger between the Lutheran Church in America, the American Lutheran Church,
and the Association of Evangelical Lutheran Churches. Lutherans Allow Dissent in Pro-
nouncements, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 27, 1989, at 22.
102. Black, 471 N.W.2d at 717.
103. Id. at 718.
104. Brief for Respondent at A-48 to A-52, Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (No. C5-91-71).
105. Id. at A-50.
106. Id.
107. Black, 471 N.W.2d at 717-18. These advances included sexually suggestive
physical contact, as well as Snyder's assertions to Black that the two were lovers. Id.
108. Id. at 718. The reason stated for the discharge was Black's "inability to con-
duct the pastoral office efficiently in this congregation in view of local conditions."
Id.
109. Brief for Respondent at 5, Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (No. C5-91-71).
110. Id. Black asserted the following causes of action: sexual harassment, retalia-
tory termination, breach of contract, defamation, and wrongful termination. Black
sought monetary damages and injunctive relief ordering public acknowledgment of
the wrongfulness of her discharge and cleansing of her personnel record. Id. at 6.
111. Black, 471 N.W.2d at 718.
112. Id.
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cise Clause of the First Amendment., 13 Applying the Smith analysis,
the court concluded that Black's claims did not implicate laws that
"expressly mandate or prohibit religious conduct or beliefs, or in-
volve additional constitutional rights."l14 Accordingly, Black's
claim for sexual harassment did not violate the church's free exercise
rights as that right was interpreted in Smith."15
Second, the court considered whether the application of the Act
would violate the Establishment Clause. Applying the Lemon test," 16
the court determined that only the excessive entanglement prong of
the Lemon test was in dispute.' 17
The court acknowledged that where "core" questions of church
discipline are involved, 18 the Establishment Clause prohibits judi-
cial review of the decisions of religious institutions.' 19 Further, the
court noted that federal courts have consistently refused to question
a church's reasons for hiring or dismissing its clergy. Judicial review
of this nature would constitute "a searching and therefore impermis-
sible inquiry" into church doctrine and thereby constitute excessive
entanglement.120 Although the court stressed that the Establish-
ment Clause does not grant religious institutions total immunity
from judicial scrutiny, 12i the court reasoned that where inquiries
113. Id. at 718-19.
114. Black, 471 N.W.2d at 719. The court found that the Minnesota Human
Rights Act and MINN. STAT. § 181.932 were "otherwise valid, generally applicable,
and facially neutral." Id. For a discussion of the Smith test, see supra notes 51-53 and
accompanying text.
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
117. Black, 471 N.W.2d at 719-20.
118. The reference to "core" questions suggests that some matters of internal
church administration are not precluded from judicial review. In Serbian E. Ortho-
dox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), the Supreme Court stressed that it
could not entangle itself in ecclesiastical questions that "involve a matter of internal
church government, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical affairs." Id. at 721.
119. Black, 471 N.W.2d at 720. The dissent argued that, because the basis of
Black's claim against St. John's addressed the issue of how the church "disciplines,
transfers and terminates its religious personnel," allowing Black to pursue her claim
would constitute excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 721 (Ran-
dall,J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that inquiry into Black's claims, after the
church's decision not to discipline Snyder, would constitute an "improper examina-
tion of St. John's internal church values regarding pastoral qualifications" and there-
fore violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 723.
120. Id. at 720 (quoting Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 723). See also Minker v. Baltimore
Annual Conf. of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(holding that "[tihe decision to appoint a minister is uniquely within a church's eccle-
siastical discretion"); Natal v. Christian and Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1578
(1st Cir. 1989) (holding that Free Exercise Clause bars inquiry into reasons for minis-
ter's termination, since inquiry would involve impermissible scrutiny of church "pol-
icy, administration, and governance").
121. Black, 471 N.W.2d at 720.
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into church doctrine were avoidable, a court may rely on "neutral
methods of proof" to resolve the dispute. Here, the Establishment
Clause did not bar judicial review.122
By invoking the "neutral methods of proof" exception, the court
reasoned that, since Black's claim for sexual harassment was based
purely on events occuring before and unrelated to her discharge and
was "unrelated to pastoral qualifications or issues of church doc-
trine," she could maintain a sexual harassment claim against the
church without violating the Establishment Clause.123 The court
noted that the level of government interference required to adjudi-
cate Black's sexual harassment claim would be no greater than in the
case of laws requiring religious counselors to report incidents of
child abuse. 124 While recognizing that courts have frequently de-
clined to examine discriminatory terminations asserted by members
of the clergy, the court stressed that no court had ever expressly held
that the Establishment Clause bars a clergy member's suit for sexual
harassment against a fellow clergy member.125 The court therefore
reversed the trial court's dismissal of Black's sexual harassment claim
against the church.' 26
Third, the court examined the propriety of Black's claims under
the state constitution's freedom of conscience clause.' 27 The court
acknowledged that, under the state constitution, the state must
demonstrate a compelling interest whenever religious rights are bur-
dened, and the state interest must be carried out in the least restric-
tive manner possible.128 However, the court concluded that Black's
claim for sexual harassment would not burden the church's religious
practices, since ELCA policy itself prohibited sexual harassment.' 29
122. Id. (citing Minker, 894 F.2d at 1360-61).
123. Black, 471 N.W.2d at 720-21.
124. Id. at 721. A statute requiring the reporting of child abuse by religious coun-
selors is not a violation of the First Amendment, even if the statute does exempt
clergy when they are counseling in their role as clergy. See State v. Motherwell, 788
P.2d 1066, 1074-76 (Wash. 1990).
125. Black, 471 N.W.2d at 721.
126. Id. at 720-21. The court did conclude, however, that Black's claims for
breach of contract, retaliatory termination, and violation of the "whistle blower" stat-
ute would necessitate judicial scrutiny into areas fundamentally related to church
doctrine. Id. at 720. Therefore, dismissal of these claims was proper. Id.
127. Black, 471 N.W.2d at 721.
128. Id.
129. Id. Black's claims against Snyder and the church went to trial in September
1992. See Margaret Zack, Jury Finds Former Pastor Wasn't Victim of Harassment, MPLS.
STAR TRIB., Oct. 10, 1992, at 4B. After five weeks of trial and one hour deliberation,
the jury concluded that Susan Black was not sexually harassed by Pastor Snyder. Id.
Despite the defeat, Black's attorney, Gerald Laurie, stressed the significance of the
appellate court's decision. Mr. Laurie characterized the court's decision as having
established that "Black didn't leave her secular rights on the church steps." Id.
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The court further held that even if the church's religious practices
were incidentally burdened, the state's interest in eradicating sexual
harassment was compelling.13O The court also posited that enforce-
ment through the Minnesota Human Rights Act was the least restric-
tive means of accomplishing the state objective of eliminating
discrimination.131 Therefore, Black's sexual harassment claim was
also a viable cause of action under the Minnesota Constitution.
IV. ANALYSIS
In allowing Black to pursue her claim against the church, the court
of appeals created an exception-for sexual harassment claims-to
the general prohibition against clergy employment discrimination
claims. This exception is not supported by precedent.
A. The Principle of Deference
Any dispute arising out of the church-minister employment rela-
tionship is ecclesiastical in nature, and necessarily involves an imper-
missible inquiry into church doctrine.132 The relationship between a
church and its ministers is at the very core of the institution's reli-
gious mission.lSS While the court of appeals attempted to distin-
guish Black's claims from similar discrimination claims because her
claims were based on pre-discharge harassment, the distinction was
illusory since prior decisions have uniformly characterized employ-
ment decisions as internal decisions, which are beyond permissible
scrutiny by the court. 134
Inquiring into terms and conditions of employment that exist prior
to termination is no less intrusive than inquiring into the reasons for
hiring or firing a clergy member. While most decisions involve
claims arising out of termination, prior decisions have not distin-
guished between claims arising out of termination and claims related
130. Black, 471 N.W.2d at 721.
131. Id.
132. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
133. See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972) (stating
that the "relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its life
blood."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
134. In McClure, the court noted:
[I]n addition to injecting the State into substantive ecclesiastical matters, or
investigation and review of such matters, of church administration and gov-
ernment as a minister's salary, his place of assignment and his duty, which
involve a person at the heart of any religious organization, could only pro-
duce by its coercive effect the very opposite of that separation of church and
State contemplated by the First Amendment.
Id. at 560. See also Granfield v. Catholic Univ. of America, 530 F.2d 1035, 1047 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (holding that the determination of priests' salaries is an internal religious
matter), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 821 (1976).
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to conditions during employment.135 Courts merely hold that such
issues are ecclesiastical matters, beyond the jurisdiction of the
courts.
In addition, judicial investigation of a claim for sexual harassment
necessarily involves scrutiny of the church's internal disciplinary pro-
cess,136 notwithstanding the court's assertion that the dispute could
be resolved by relying on neutral methods of proof.
A claim for sexual harassment requires an intensive examination
into matters of church policy. This is precisely the type of inquiry
against which Minker warned.137 A sexual harassment claim requires
the court to evaluate the appropriateness of the employer's response
to a complaint of sexual harassment. 38 In doing so, the court must
necessarily examine the church's constitution and written policies to
determine whether the policies are adequate and whether the church
acted in accordance with them. The Supreme Court has held that
this type of scrutiny into the internal administration of a religious
institution is forbidden by the First Amendment.13 9
B. The Free Excercise Clause
In examining the free exercise claim, the court erroneously ap-
plied the principles of Smith 140 in concluding that the church's free
excercise rights were not violated. Smith only restricts an individual's
right to claim a religious exemption from "an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."141 The state
has never been free to regulate the employment relationship be-
tween a church and its ministers.142 Accordingly, Smith is inapposite
and does not nullify the precedent of deference established by Wat-
son v. Jones and its progeny, decisions which firmly support the auton-
omy of religious institutions in employment decisions. 143
C. The Establishment Clause
In examining the Establishment Clause claim, the court applied
the Lemon test, 144 yet the court failed to acknowledge the distinction
between government actions that affect ministerial employees and
135. See McClure, 460 F.2d at 560.
136. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
137. See Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conf. of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d
1354, 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
138. See Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241, 249 (Minn. 1980).
139. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976).
140. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
141. Id. at 879.
142. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 23-38 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
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those that affect nonministerial employees. The court noted that al-
lowing Black to pursue her claim would not violate the Establishment
Clause, since it would involve roughly the same level of scrutiny as
laws requiring churches to report child abuse.14 5 To support its po-
sition, the court relied on a Washington state court decision holding
that mandatory child abuse reporting laws did not violate the exces-
sive entanglement prong.14
6
The court failed to note, however, that the Washington decision
cited for support distinguished between ministerial and nonminis-
terial employees.m4 7 In fact, the Washington decision held that min-
isters who became aware of abuse while counseling their parishoners
were exempt from reporting requirements. 148
D. The Minnesota Constitution
By concluding that the freedom of conscience clause of the Minne-
sota Constitution did not preclude action under the Minnesota
Human Rights Act, the court construed the phrase "religious prac-
tice" too narrowly.14 9 The definition of religious practice should not
be limited only to those ritual activities motivated by religious doc-
trine. 150 Rather, it should be construed broadly to include the inter-
nal decisions of religious institutions. Developing a consistent
doctrine of noninterference with the internal administration of reli-
gious institutions is fundamental to the protection of religious free-
dom under the Minnesota Constitutionl5l and is supported by
Minnesota case law.152
The court recognized that under the state constitution the state
must demonstrate a compelling interest when church interests are
burdened.153 However, the court concluded that St. John's religious
practices were not burdened by application of the statute, since the
church policy itself prohibited sexual harassment. As the dissent in
145. Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied,
(Minn. Aug. 29, 1991).
146. See State v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1990). In Motherwell, the
Washington Supreme Court held that mandatory child abuse reporting laws did not
violate the excessive entanglement prong. The Washington court upheld the convic-
tions of two religious counselors for failure to report incidents of child abuse to au-
thorities. Id. at 1074.
147. Id. at 1069.
148. Id.
149. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16.
150. See Laycock, supra note 50, at 1388-92. Professor Laycock argues that "[any
activity engaged in by a church as a body is an exercise of religion." Id. at 1390.
151. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16. The freedom of conscience clause states that "con-
trol of or interference with the rights of conscience" shall not be permitted. Id.
152. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
153. Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied,
(Minn. Aug. 29, 1991).
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Black pointed out, the majority ignored Minker,'54 which dismissed a
minister's discrimination claim, despite the fact that discrimination
was contrary to the church's stated policy.
Finally, the court concluded that, even if religious practices were
burdened, the state has a compelling interest in eradicating sexual
harassment, and, here, the state's interest outweighs the church's in-
terest.' 55 Again, this holding is contrary to Minnesota precedent.
Minnesota courts have clearly stated that only practices which
threaten the peace or safety of the state are sufficiently compelling to
override the protections of the freedom of conscience clause.156
V. CONCLUSION
Prior to Black, courts had consistently declined to examine discrim-
ination claims involving the hiring and promotion of clergy mem-
bers. In Black, the Minnesota Court of Appeals deviated from a long
line of precedent requiring dismissal of discrimination claims
brought by clergy members against their employers. This Note does
not deny that sexual harassment is a serious problem for female
clergy members. However, the rights of the individual are out-
weighed by the potential for harm when government is permitted to
take an active role in disputes within the church.
Kathleen Milner*
154. Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conf. of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d
1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
155. Black, 471 N.W.2d at 721.
156. See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 398-99 (Minn. 1990).
* The author wishes to thank Reverand Paula V. Mehmel for her insight while
preparing this article.
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